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Abstract: 
This chapter outlines the role of the judiciary in shaping the European administrative system, the major 
developmental stages of judicial review of administrative action and the evolution of concepts under which judicial 
accountability has been exercised. In this context, it looks at the consequences for judicial accountability by the 
increasing integration of administrative procedures in the EU. This chapter argues that such procedural forms of 
cooperation have been established with a primary concern for efficiency of de-central administrative action but less 
with regard to possibilities of exercising judicial review ensuring compliance with written provisions and General 






This chapter looks at effects of the exercise of judicial review on the development of the European 
administrative space in the EU and, more specifically, at the conditions of implementation of EU 
policies by administrative action in the EU. Such judicial review takes place by the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU)1 and of the Member States. The chapter outlines some long-term 
trends and effects of holding administrative action to account by means of judicial review and 
Courts’ possibilities of influencing the development of public law in the EU.2 It thereby looks not 
only at the ‘big picture’ of the major phases of transformations of the system of implementing EU 
law by means of administrative activities. It also asks what the effects of these transformations 
have been on the possibilities of exercising judicial review and which future developments might 
be necessary to remedy some of the remaining or newly emerging problematic aspects of the 
system. With regard to the past developments, this chapter therefore uses a descriptive approach 
historically contextualising the observed features. With regard to the discussion of possible 
consequences, it compares the existing and observed status quo with some requirements arising 
from general principles of EU as developed in no small part by the case law of the CJEU itself. 
This chapter is therefore not concerned with the CJEU’s own administration as institution of the 
EU. The CJEU’s own administration essentially exists in the form of the Registrars’ offices in 
charge of administering the incoming cases, the communications with the parties involved 
including the receipt, notification and retention of all procedural documents as well as the 
translation service. This administrative activity of the Court is thus strictly ensuring the exercise of 
the judiciary function, which in turn has been a powerful tool for shaping the conditions of the 
exercise of powers in the European administrative system. The latter function of the Courts is the 




Two major transformations of administration in the EU and the role of the courts 
 
The European Union is a legal system which, during the past 60 years of its evolution, has 
developed and transformed itself many times. One of the ways in which the European Union 
polity has evolved in recent years is in the nature and breadth of the tasks it performs as well as 
the range of actors who perform them. Despite this, the various Treaty amendments of the past 
decades have left the forms of judicial review largely unchanged. Only the Treaty of Lisbon 
introduced some limited amendment for the action for annulment in Article 263 TFEU. 
Irrespective of the relative stability of the structure and organisation of judicial review in the EU, 
the conditions for exercising judicial review have profoundly changed. Not only has there been an 
increase in forms of administrative action on the EU level, also the ‘Europeanisation’ of Member 
State political and legal systems has intensified. This in consequence, has led to a larger amount of 
policy areas affected, the creation of a greater diversity of actors and forms of procedural 
interaction between them. At the same time, the last 60 years have also been marked by a profound 
change in the understanding of the necessary coherence of a legal system in that the role of 
fundamental rights and principles as guiding concepts for all policy areas has risen. On the EU 
level this is reflected also by an increasing amount of sources of such rights, principles and values 
which need to be balanced. These changes were, in part, the results of case-law of the CJEU often 
developed in cooperation with national courts; In part, they can be attributed to changes in the 
nature of the legal system of the EU to which courts are struggling to find answers. 
Regarding the former, the CJEU has itself over time established criteria for legality of action of 
administrations as well as for interpretation of written EU law by the development of General 
Principles of EU law. Such General Principles include procedural rights such as inter alia the right 
to an effective judicial remedy or the right to good or sound administration, as well as specific 
substantive rights such as the right to property, to academic freedom and others. They also include 
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criteria for the exercise of judicial review such as the principle of proportionality. Within the legal 
system, all rights are also regarded as General Principles of EU law.3 They serve multiple purposes 
such as providing a guide to the interpretation of Union law, including Treaty provisions, and 
constituting grounds of review of any kind of Union acts created by the institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies of the Union. In that, depending on their nature, General Principles of law can either 
be used as criteria for reviewing the legality of acts or directly to ensure the protection of 
individuals’ rights in the face of administrative action from various levels.  
General Principles of law – whether comprehensively addressed in Treaty provisions or 
predominantly arising from the case law of the CJEU – are also the key of the common 
constitutional law of the Union in that they contribute to the purpose to enhance the coherent 
interpretation and application of Union law also regarding its implementation by Member States. 
In fact the General Principles of law are concepts which have to be complied with throughout the 
European administrative system not only in the case of implementation of EU law in the strict, 
limited sense of transposition of EU legal acts,4 but also when Member States derogate from it,5 
that is, in all cases which ‘fall within the scope of Community law’,6 and when Member States use 
their legal systems to enforce obligations arising under EU law.7 In that, General Principles of EU 
law as developed by the CJEU have had a considerable influence on Member State and even private 
party action whenever the scope of EU law, for example by application of fundamental freedoms 
of the TFEU, is touched. 
Given case-by-case nature of judicial review, not surprisingly, the set of General Principles of law 
recognised today was not developed not develop as a comprehensive and consistent set of 
principles in one go. In fact, the development is ongoing. Instead, the full canon of General 
Principles of EU law, as we know them today, when seen from a historic point of view of legal 
integration, started to be recognised in the first cases in matters judging the European Coal and 
Steel Community. The largely procedural rights recognised in this phase include the protection of 
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legitimate expectations, the prohibition of retroactivity and the notion of proportionality as a 
criteria for review.8 An enlarged set of principles was then recognised in the wake of the first 
enlargement of the Community in the form of defence rights of individuals against Commission 
action. A further wave of developments started in the 1990ies and the subsequent ‘Nordic’ 
enlargement with an increased awareness of the need for transparency, access to documents and 
other rights of individuals’ vis-à-vis the administrative system. Finally, since the turn of the century, 
a stronger fundamental rights bias and with it a strengthening of notions of proportionality have 
occurred which cumulated in the creation and incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
into primary law of the EU. Generally, and with hindsight, they can all be classified as deriving 
from the rule of law. 
The recognition of General Principles of EU law by the CJEU, however, took place against the 
background of profound changes in EU law and policies. The past decades have been marked by 
an increase in policy areas subject to Europeanisation and a continuous development of forms of 
implementation. In the wake of these developments, the legal and political system has become 
more complex and more directly relevant to citizens’ lives. Also, the dynamic development of 
European integration has in reality changed the effects of judicial accountability on the European 
administrative system profoundly. This change also took place over time and goes hand-in-hand 
with the transformation of the notion of the state in the process of integration.  
In simplified terms, the system of administration in Europe began its development on the basis of 
a system within ‘closed’ states with national administrations as state-specific structures reflecting 
different identities, historic traditions of organisation (Hofmann: 2008, 662-676). It has developed 
to what is today an ever more integrated system of EU and national administration cooperating 
with the goal of implementing EU law. The path from relative independence to a high level of 
integration can be described in the following terms: With the development by the CJEU of the 
‘constitutional’ principles of direct effect and supremacy of EU law, the notion of implementation 
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of EU law became an obligation of each administration and Court – not only of the national 
legislature transposing international law into national law. This changed the approach to the 
administrative system in that it required the Member State legal systems to ‘open’ themselves to 
implementing EU polies formulated through EU law. This to a certain degree began to erode the 
importance of the distinction the ‘inner sphere’ of a state - organised by national law - and its ‘outer 
sphere’ -organised by public international law. A second phase of development of towards a 
European administrative system became more disruptive for the traditional borders between 
national administrations of individual Member States as well as those between national and EU’s 
administrations. The requirements of a true single market as a legal space without internal frontiers 
were spelt out by the CJEU to require an increasing response of administrative cooperation and 
mutual recognition of the administrative and legislative decisions of other member states (Weiler: 
1991).9 In terms of the administrative system this led to an opening of the administrative systems 
of the member States to allow ‘foreign’ administrative decision’s  effect within the own 
jurisdictional territory. A third phase quickly followed. It was a designed as a reaction of the 
legislature to the demands of the judiciary on mutual recognition within the single market. Since 
in many policy areas, mutual recognition and assistance did not prove sufficient to create a single 
legal space and single market, the response in terms of administrative organisation and structures 
was twofold:  First, through intensified procedural cooperation by the executive branch of powers 
from the Member States and the EU, as well as, second, the creation of organisational forums for 
cooperation in comitology committees, European agencies and many networks of actors created 
formally or informally through obligations of procedural cooperation. Under the growing debate 
about subsidiarity, there was also little appetite to build large-scale administrative capacities for 
implementation of EU law on the EU level. In view of the then relatively small administrative 
capacities of the EU in relation to its duties (Kassim 2003: 151), the solution was to link the de-
central administrations in network structures. This third phase of development can be described 
as the move to an ‘integrated administration’ (Hofmann/Türk: 2007). The integration of 
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administrations took place in a policy-by-policy development by means of procedural cooperation 
of varying intensity.  
As a consequence of these developments, in many policy areas the development of the integration 
of EU and national administrative proceedings has led to ‘composite proceedings’. These are 
administrative procedures which – although finally terminated by a decision on either the 
European, or the national level – are undertaken with input from various jurisdictions (Cassese 
2004: 21-36; Cananea: 2004, 197-218; Chiti: 2004, 37-60; Sydow: 2001, 517-542; Schmidt-Aßmann: 
1996, 270-301). This development, importantly, has led in an increasing number of policy areas to 
a growing gap between, on one hand, the jurisdiction taking a decision and, on the other hand, the 
jurisdiction investigating the conditions and facts leading to such decision. Examples for such 
multi-jurisdictional decision making procedures are for example the areas in which alert systems 
exist on the basis of which executive bodies from one Member State act implementing the warning 
of another. These exist for example in areas of regulation of the single market in the area of food 
safety or medicines. Alert systems also exist in the field of visa an immigration matters for example 
in the context of the Schengen Information System (SIS). Composite procedures also exist in the 
field of planning – be it in the field of environmental law, emissions trading, transport and energy 
and many other fields. Under these conditions, the identification of responsibility for parts of a 
final act amongst actors of several jurisdictions is emerging as a challenge. This also has 
implications for conditions of judicial review and its effectiveness when legal provisions from 
multiple jurisdictions have been applied to create one single administrative outcome (Hofmann: 
2009, 136-167; Hofmann/Tidghi: 2014). Where administration from various jurisdictions 
contribute to a final act adopted either by an EU institution or body or by a Member State, input 





The state of judicial accountability of administrative action  
 
Today’s EU-specific possibilities of holding administrations judicially to account have, in a 
nutshell, developed, on one hand, with the expansion of the role of General Principles of EU law 
which in principle should allow for a review of compliance of administrations implementing EU 
policies across levels. However, on the other hand, with the increasingly integrated administration 
often engaged in composite procedures, the exercise of judicial review has become significantly 
more difficult in reality. The reason is that the system of judicial review of administrative action in 
the EU is established in a traditional two-level approach. The separation of the levels is much more 
distinct than the sophistication of procedural integration seen on the level of administration 
cooperation. The decisive factor is not that courts are organised either as national courts or as 
courts of the CJEU. This organisational separation is also a feature of administrative actors being 
organised either on the EU level as institutions of the EU or EU agencies. The difference is that 
Courts, unlike administrations, are procedurally much less integrated. This obscures possibilities 
of allocating responsibility and finding adequate remedies for judicial review in procedures of 
composite nature.  
Judicial supervision of action of the integrated executives in the EU is undertaken generally by 
Member State courts. The CJEU with its General Court and Court of Justice are generally called 
upon directly only for actions for annulment of acts of EU institutions (Article 263 TFEU), bodies 
and agencies or in a claim for damages for their alleged wrongdoing (Article 340 TFEU). The 
CJEU as the highest court of the legal system enjoys the monopoly of interpretation of EU law 
and has the sole right to annul acts of the EU institutions.  
Member State courts can require the Court of Justice to give a preliminary reference on questions 
of interpretation of EU law or validity of acts of the institutions (Article 267 TFEU). The success 
of this process lies in the cooperation of courts from different levels (Maduro: 2003, 512). The 
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procedure of preliminary reference assured that the relations between the courts were non-
hierarchical in so far as Member State law could not demand the exhaustion of national remedies 
prior to such a request. The result is a system in which the national judge has also become in effect 
a Union judge, and where the supremacy of European law does not imply the inferiority of national 
courts. It should be noted in this connection, however, that one characteristic of the preliminary 
reference procedure is that the CJEU makes findings only regarding the Union law aspects of 
cases. The final decision of the case rests with the national judge. Problems with this form of 
cooperation, in view of the highly integrated EU executives, arise from the fact that the 
cooperation structures provided through Article 267 TFEU operate in only one direction. They 
allow only for ‘vertical’ cooperation initiated by national courts. Other dimensions characteristic 
of a genuine network, such as vertical cooperation initiated by the CJEU or horizontal cooperation 
between Member State courts, are not provided for. The latter might be especially useful in the 
context of judicial review of the increasing amount of measures created in composite procedures 
in the areas of implementation of policies and executive rulemaking. 
Direct access to the CJEU, on the other hand, is limited to cases of actions for annulment of acts 
of Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies (Article 263 TFEU). In review of these cases, 
however the CJEU has no possibility of reviewing the input into a decision by national authorities, 
even when the latter act under EU law. In cases, where Member State actors are implementing 
Union law, national courts are in charge of reviewing the legality of a national decision. National 
courts can ask the CJEU for an authoritative interpretation of EU law or request to review the 
legality of an EU act in view of higher Union law including General Principles of EU law through 
the preliminary reference procedure under Article 267 TFEU. But they have no such tool to 
request the legality of input into their decision coming from other Member States.  
Review of decisions taken by these means by the Court of the jurisdiction which adopted the final 
measure might not be able to do justice to the requirements of effective judicial review of the 
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preparatory acts from other jurisdictions. There is, thus, in these areas a potential mismatch 
between procedural integration of de-centrally organised administrations, on one hand, and a clear 
separation of judicial competencies, on the other. Where such gaps may arise between dispersed 
decision-making powers and judicial review, such gaps would be detrimental to the application of 
the right to an effective judicial remedy.10 The right to an effective remedy is a General Principle 
of EU law which has also explicitly been recognised in Article 47 CFR. It requires that ‘everyone 
whose rights and freedoms are guaranteed by the Law of the Union’, be given the possibility to 
obtain a ‘remedy to set aside national measures which are in conflict therewith’ (van Gerven: 2000, 
509).11 
In interpretation of this principle, given that the EU is a legal system with multiple levels, the CJEU 
has held that in the absence of judicial remedies on the Union level, it is for the Member States to 
establish a sufficiently complete ‘system of legal remedies and procedures which ensure respect 
for the right to effective judicial protection’ of Union law.12 Accordingly, case law by the CJEU 
held that Member States were obliged to ensure that their courts provide ‘direct and immediate 
protection’ of rights arising from the Union legal order.13 This over time evolved towards the 
General Principle requiring that rights arising from EU law, be ‘effectively protected in each case’.14 
Where therefore, it comes to Member State action, rights under European law necessarily imply 
the existence of a corresponding remedy. The ‘form and extent’ of such remedy as well as the 
procedural rules to make it operational are, however, in principle within national competence 
(Galetta: 2010), except for matters where the Treaties have explicitly granted jurisdiction to the 
EU-level. Thus, national Courts are required to ‘guarantee real and effective judicial protection’.15 
Anything which ‘might prevent, even temporarily, Community rules from having full force and 
effect’ is therefore incompatible with Union law.16 In view of these obligations, national Courts 
often face the difficulty that the fact that the substance of administrative cooperation in composite 
procedures is in particular the joint gathering and subsequent sharing of information. Reliance on 
ex post review of a final act risks becoming increasingly insufficient to ensure effective legal 
11 
 
protection. This makes judicial accountability all the more difficult as no forms of horizontal 
preliminary references exist for the judges of one Member State to request an authoritative 
interpretation of the law of another legal system. This problem is only theoretically addressed by 
the requirement under the case law of the CJEU that Member States and their courts are under 
the obligation to create additional remedies to those already existent under national procedural 
rules, if such were necessary to ensure the relation between right and remedy under EU law. 
Examples are UPA,17 regarding the protection of individuals against regulations which for their 
effect do not require any further implementing measures; Borelli,18 regarding the protection of 
individuals in composite procedures with input from Union and Member State administrations 
into a final administrative decision; as well as Factortame,19 regarding the establishment of a system 
of interim relief to effectively protect a right under EU law. These requirements have so far only 
regarded rights of standing. Factually, the national courts, given the complexity of composite 
information-driven cooperation between administrations, will often not be capable of addressing 
the substance of a case. 
For accountability within the system as a whole this has important consequences. Integrated 
executives function through the notion of strong procedural cooperation within various forms of 
networks. There is thus an almost inevitable disparity between the organisational forms available 
for institutional action in administrative implementation and the mechanisms of judicial 
accountability external to the administration itself. Traditionally organised multi-level supervisory 
structures face difficulties, then, in penetrating the details of differently organized executive 
instrumentalities. They are challenged by locating responsibility for, procedural and substantive 
errors made and inadequate functional performance within the context of administrative networks, 
and by finding adequate remedies and correctives for this. They also display special difficulty in 
coping with the fact that the core of executive cooperation within composite procedures is the 




Where to go from here? 
 
The arguments of this chapter are based on a multi-dimensional understanding of EU administrative 
law. The obligation to ensure proper implementation of EU law and policies as a function is shared 
by EU and Member State administrations. These administrations, although organisationally 
fragmented in that they are either EU bodies or bodies of the Member States, in most policy areas, 
must cooperate through integrated procedures. As a consequence, especially in policy areas in 
which information networks have been created, it is becoming increasingly impossible to allocate 
responsibility for policy decisions to one level or another. Decision-making, one could say, is in 
many cases ‘national, transnational, and supranational, all at the same time’ (Bignami: 2004, 1-20).  
In absence of strong and effective procedures for judicial cooperation to exercise effective 
supervision of integrated administrations, it would appear that there is a need for a comprehensive, 
critical, and systematic reconsideration of the structures developing in the context of the 
implementation of EU law. In other words, it needs to be recognised that significant 
transformations of the legal and political environment for implementation of EU law have 
substantially affected the possibilities of exercising judicial control. The key problem appears to be 
that many administrative procedures have become ‘composite’, drawing on input from different 
levels and actors. Under these conditions, holding administrative bodies to account for their action 
is hampered by the fact responsibility for the various steps of an administrative procedure lies 
bodies in different jurisdictions each applying their specific law with which courts from other 
jurisdictions not only lack familiarity but also competence to judge upon. This fact in turn has 
implications for transparency, and for allocating responsibility for safeguarding the procedural and 
substantial rights of individuals affected.  
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The question therefore arises what the judiciary, the legislatures on the European and national 
levels have can do in response to these challenges (Hofmann/Rowe/Türk: 2011, 4-19). I would 
submit, that if the outline of the problems to exercising judicial accountability in the EU presented 
in this chapter is correct, it would allow for two potential avenues towards developing solutions.  
The first would be to develop forms of judicial cooperation between national judges (horizontal 
relation) and with the CJEU (as a two-way vertical relation as opposed to the current set-up of 
Article 267 TFEU allowing for only one-way preliminary references). Part of the problem to date 
is that the system of judicial review remains oriented towards a model of a two-level system 
following a logic of separation of powers between the EU and the national levels. Consequently, 
national courts may not review acts of the EU institutions,20 and similarly, the CJEU may not 
review national acts.21 It might be now time to consider expanding the possible references by 
courts allowing courts of Member States to obtain a preliminary ruling from courts of other 
Member States to review the input of other Member State administrations into a procedure, the 
final act of which was taken by a national administration. Expanding the judicial network would 
then allow for a more effective supervision of administrative cooperation in multiple-step 
procedures and might therefore also increase the legal certainty in the system. One approach to 
more comprehensive systems of reference could be to develop the preliminary reference procedure 
to allow for the CJEU to also refer questions to national courts as to the application of national 
law in composite procedures. 
A second line of thought would be to develop approaches to reduce the diversity of legal systems 
applicable in single legal procedures or, if that should not prove to be possible, reduce the negative 
side effects of a reduced possibility of judicial oversight. One approach to developing such a 
solution would the adoption of a general Law of Administrative Procedure for the EU. The Treaty 
of Lisbon has developed a legal basis in Article 298 TFEU for such an act covering implementing 
activities by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the EU. This legal basis can be used in 
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combination with other provisions of the Treaty such as Article 114 TFEU, having the same 
legislative procedure and would allow for the extension of such provisions also to Member State 
activities when implementing EU law designed for the internal market. The scope of application 
of such legislation would then be capable of covering all relevant levels and could lead to a 
significant reduction of the laws applicable to procedures. That might carry the additional 
advantages of enhancing the protection of individual rights of both natural and legal persons 
dealing directly with the EU administrations as well as those dealing with national administrations 
when implementing EU law since these rights would be set out in one piece of legislation, with 
sector-specific law providing for more far-reaching protection if required. Guiding interpretation 
of such law by the CJEU could immediately be used by the courts throughout the EU and lead to 
joint standards of good administration in the implementation of EU law. Next to these benefits, a 
general law on EU administrative procedures could further have as side effect the possibility of 
simplifying policy-specific legislation in that the basic rules of procedure can be applied by 
reference to the general administrative procedures act. (Mir 2011; Ziller 2011a; Ziller 2011b). The 
positive effects to the legal system might also include a certain degree of consolidation of General 
Principles of law applicable to administrative procedures in implementing EU law by making them 
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